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VESTIGES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
BY STEVEN G. GEY *
INTRODUCTION
With the confirmation of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court, there is a strong likelihood that we
now have a Supreme Court comprised of five members who are deeply
opposed to virtually everything the Supreme Court has said about the
relationship between church and state, since the Court first started
rigorously enforcing the Establishment Clause in 1947. We may be on
the cusp of a root-and-branch change in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, .which will fundamentally alter the landscape of
church/state relations and produce a constitutional regime that
specifically permits the government to endorse the views of the religious
majority and use government programs to advance the majority's
sectarian goals.
These assertions about the Court's new path involve a certain
amount of speculation about the views of the new Justices. Many will
undoubtedly prefer to take a Panglossian view of the immediate future,
or at least to wait and see how the new Justices perform on the Court
before writing off sixty years of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
But even if previous generations of legal leopards occasionally have
changed their spots once they arrived at the Supreme Court, neither of
the new Justices are likely to fit that pattern. In our deeply politicized
world, recent Republican administrations have steadfastly made ideology
a central feature of their judicial appointments,' and issues of church and
* David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor of
Law, Florida State University College of Law. J.D., Columbia University, 1982;
B.A., Eckerd University, 1978.
1. For one description of the "constitution in exile" movement and its effect on
judicial nominations in the Bush White House, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated
Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 17, 2005, at 42, 43.
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state have been at the forefront of this ideological agenda.2 The two
individuals chosen to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor passed the administration's ideological litmus test with flying
colors, especially with'regard to issues of church and state. Both of the
new Justices worked for Republican administrations that were noted for
urging fundamental changes in the constitutional law regarding church
3and state, and both of the new Justices are individually on record as
supporting such a change.4 In addition to his work for previous
2. See David D. Kirkpatrick, For Conservative Christians, Game Plan on the
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A14 (describing, in conjunction with the
nomination of John Roberts, a "two-year-old campaign by conservative groups to
portray Democrats as anti-Catholic or even antireligious for questioning the personal
views of judicial nominees on abortion or other subjects of church teachings").
3. Chief Justice John Roberts worked for the Reagan Administration as Special
Assistant to the Attorney General (from 1981-82), and as Associate Counsel to the
President in the Office of White House Counsel (from 1982-86): See United States
Supreme Court, The Justices of the Supreme Court, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf. He then worked for
the first Bush Administration as Principal Deputy Solicitor General (from 1989-93).
Justice Alito also worked for the Reagan Administration as Assistant to the Solicitor
General (from 1981-85) and Deputy Assistant Attorney General (from 1985-87). Id.
4. While serving in the Reagan Office of White House Counsel, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote a memorandum praising then-Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion
in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), in which Rehnquist harshly criticized the
concept of separation of church and state, and the entire tenor of modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Roberts noted that Rehnquist "took a tenuous
five-person majority and tried to revolutionize Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
and ended up losing the majority." Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F.
Fielding, at 2 (June 4, 1985), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/roberts/Box48-JGR-SchoolPrayerl.pdf. Roberts then went on
to praise Rehnquist's attempt to "revolutionize" the Establishment Clause
jurisprudence by adopting the theory that the government may endorse religion, so
long as it does not endorse a particular sect. "Which is not to say the effort was
misguided. In the larger scheme of things what is important is not whether this law
is upheld or struck down, but what test is applied." Id. Samuel Alito expressed
similar views when applying for a job as deputy assistant attorney general for the
Reagan Administration. In his application, Alito wrote that in college he "developed
a deep interest in constitutional law, motivated in large part by disagreement with
Warren Court decisions, particularly in the areas of criminal procedure, the
Establishment Clause, and reapportionment." Samuel Alito's PPO Non-Career
Appointment Form, at 3 (Nov. 15, 1985), available at http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/
alitoDOJ.pdf. Nothing in their later judicial opinions or statements made at their
confirmation hearings indicate that either Roberts or Alito have changed their
narrow views of the protections offered by the Establishment Clause.
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Republican administrations, Judge Alito also has a fairly extensive
judicial record on the subject.5 There is nothing in the record of either
new Justice that provides even the slightest solace to the latter day Dr.
Panglosses regarding the sustainability of the Madisonian Establishment
Clause. From all indications, both Justices are frankly hostile to the
basic concept of separation of church and state, and will actively
campaign on the Court to eradicate the principle altogether from the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In every type of
Establishment Clause dispute they will be joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who have frequently expressed their hostility to the
separationist view.6 They will also be joined by Justice Kennedy in all
cases except those involving religion in the public schools, in which
Kennedy continues to be troubled by the persistence of religious coercion
of students.7
The question, then, is what will be left of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once. the newly reconfigured Court gets through rewriting
5. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist.,
386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004) (Judge Alito writing the majority opinion permitting the
Child Evangelism Fellowship, a group dedicated to evangelizing children in
fundamentalist Christianity, to have access to public school facilities, require public
school teachers to distribute the group's religious materials to students in an
elementary school, post religious materials in the school, participate in school-
sponsored back-to-school nights, and distribute materials during the back-to-school
nights); ACLU of N.J. v. Twp. of Wall, 246 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (Judge Alito
writing an opinion articulating a very narrow standard for standing to challenge
religious displays on public property); C.H. ex reL. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 210
(3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting) (Judge Alito dissenting to an en banc
ruling dismissing a complaint against a teacher who had been involved in the
removal of a student's religious poster from the hallway of a public elementary
school, arguing that "public school students have the right to express religious views
in class discussion or in assigned work"); ACLU of N.J. ex rel. Lander v. Schundler,
168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999) (Judge Alito writing the majority opinion upholding the
constitutionality of a modified Christmas display, an earlier version of which had
been held unconstitutional by another Third Circuit panel); ACLU of N.J. v. Black
Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Judge Alito
joining the dissent in a 9-4 en banc ruling holding unconstitutional a public board of
education policy permitting students of a high school senior class to vote on whether
to include prayer in high school graduation ceremonies).
6. Justice Scalia's and Thomas's views are discussed in detail in Section II,
infra.
7. On Justice Kennedy's views in the school cases, see infra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text.
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it? The premise of this Article is that the new Establishment Clause
jurisprudence will bear little resemblance to its precursor. This will be
true at the highest level of constitutional theory, as well as at the more
mundane level of constitutional doctrine. At the theoretical level, the
new Court will replace the existing separationist Establishment Clause
paradigm with one that permits (and even encourages) the integration of
church and state., At the doctrinal level, the new Court will permit the
government to symbolically and verbally endorse the majority's religion,
and will also permit the government to finance explicitly religious
activities-including activities that involve the proselytizing of both
adults and children.
After briefly reviewing the outgoing separationist paradigm in
the first section, the second section of this Article will describe the new
integrationist Establishment Clause paradigm. Under this new paradigm,
the Court can be expected to abandon or severely dilute basic organizing
concepts that have guided the Court for over a half century-concepts
that have their origins in Madison's and Jefferson's fight for religious
liberty in Virginia and the early Republic. The third section of the
Article will then describe the doctrine through which the Court's new
majority will communicate its integrationist theory of church/state
relations. Finally, the fourth section will discuss what will remain of the
protection of religious liberty under an integrationist Establishment
Clause, with specific reference to the implications of renouncing the
concept of church/state separation. Putting the same matter more
bluntly, how will religious minorities and the large secular portion of the
population tolerate life in a political structure in which the government
increasingly will be permitted to act as an agent of the religious
majority?
I. THE SEPARATIONIST PARADIGM
One of the few things constitutional scholars of every stripe
seem to agree about is the proposition that the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is an incoherent mess. Simply cataloguing some of
the Court's rulings vividly underscores the source of the common
discontent with the Court's inability to provide consistent guidance on
constitutional matters relating to church and state. From the very
beginning of the modem era in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, for
example, the Court could definitively assert that no tax money should
[Vol. 5
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8ever be used to support religious institutions, and yet in the same case
uphold a state program transporting students to religious schools.
9
During the six decades following this ruling, the Court produced a maze
of government-financing decisions, in which many government programs
directly financing religious activity were struck down, but other
programs (often producing even larger effective subsidies) were
upheld.10 In the endorsement area, the Court ruled that some officially
sanctioned Christmas displays were permissible," while others were
not. 2 Most recently, a majority of the Court held that official displays of
the Ten Commandments both were1
3 and were not constitutional.
14
Making sense of all this was, to put the matter kindly, more an art than a
science.
Despite these frustrating and often inexplicable holdings, the
Court has been remarkably consistent about articulating a guiding
principle for its Establishment Clause rulings. In short, the need to keep
church and state separate has been a consistent theme that runs
throughout the Court's Establishment- Clause jurisprudence since the
8. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
9. Id. at 17.
10. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a government
program providing government funds to purchase educational materials such as
computers for use in private religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (upholding a program providing state-financed sign-
language interpreters to students attending religious schools); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985) (prohibiting teachers employed by public schools from conducting
"enrichment" classes in private schools); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(prohibiting state use of federal education grants to finance remedial instruction at
private schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (prohibiting a state from
loaning secular teaching materials to parents of children in religious schools); Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (prohibiting a state from providing instructional
materials and auxiliary services to private schools).
11. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a holiday display
that included a Nativity scene along with several secular holiday objects); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding a
holiday display that included an 18-foot menorah and a 45-foot Christmas tree).
12. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (striking down a nativity scene in a county
courthouse).
13. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Ten Commandments display on the grounds of the Texas state
legislature).
14. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (holding
unconstitutional a Ten Commandments display in a county courthouse).
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Court first began routinely ruling on Establishment Clause matters in the
Everson decision in 1947.15 One of the Court's most famous
Establishment Clause quotations from Everson is a virtual litany of
separationist precepts:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. 16
Taken together, these broad statements form the core of what can
be termed the separationist paradigm of the Establishment Clause. In
almost every case since Everson there have been dissenters to the
separationist paradigm, but a majority (and until very recently a large
majority) of the Court's members have supported the separationist
paradigm in theory, even though they have been notoriously unsuccessful
in consistently applying the paradigm to particular facts. They have been
equally unsuccessful in incorporating the paradigm and its four main
components into a standard that could be applied predictably by the
lower courts-instead generating an unwieldy doctrinal matrix in which
no fewer than ten different standards are used by various members of the
Court to enforce the Establishment Clause.' 7 The modern Court has also
fallen short in explaining its rationale for adopting the separation of
church and state as a guiding principle, although James Madison's
arguments against religious establishments are implicit in every one of
the Court's modern decisions. Specifically, separation of church and
state is necessary not just to protect individual religious liberty (although
that is part of the project as well), but also to provide a structural barrier•18
that keeps the church from corrupting the government and vice versa.
15. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. Id. at 15-16.
17. See infra Section III.
18. To Madison, the effect of religious establishments on religion has been
"[m]ore -or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and
[Vol. 5
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Although the broad theme of separation is implicit in almost
everything the Court has said about the Establishment Clause in the last
sixty years, in itself the separation principle tells lower courts and
government officials little about the precise parameters of what is
permitted and prohibited under the Establishment Clause. Despite its
many problems in applying the separation principle consistently, it is
possible to discern from the Court's rulings a few basic elements of
separation that help to give more substance to the basic principle.
Specifically, the Court has routinely referred to five separationist
mandates that have guided its Establishment Clause jurisprudence since
Everson. The first specific mandate of modem separationist theory is
that government may neither reward nor punish religious belief. At its
most basic, this means that religious practitioners cannot be sanctioned
for attending a disfavored church, nor can they be denied the full benefits
of citizenship-in particular, the right of political participation-because
of their religious beliefs, or lack of them. 19 But this first (and probably
most important) mandate goes beyond merely prohibiting direct legal
sanctions for unapproved beliefs. It also is the basis for the Court's
holdings that public schools may not incorporate even diluted forms of
religious endorsement into either curricular or extracurricular school
servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution." James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Everson,
330 U.S. at 67 (alteration added). Likewise, the effect of religious establishments on
the government has been
to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in
many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones
of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the
guardians of the liberties of the people. Rulers who wished
to subvert the public liberties, may have found an
established clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just
government, instituted to secure & perpetuate it, needs
them not.
Id. at 68.
19. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("Neither [state nor
federal governments] can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which
aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on
a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
beliefs.") (alteration added).
20. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting the inclusion of
prayer in a public school graduation ceremony); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963) (prohibiting officially sanctioned student Bible readings at the beginning
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
functions.21 It helps to explain the Court's repeated (albeit inconsistently
applied) assertion that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.' 22 In short, the first mandate requires actual-as opposed to
formalistic-neutrality between church and state. In the mode of Philip
Kurland's traditional version of neutrality,23 the government is supposed
to neither favor nor hinder religion, but rather allow religion to flourish
or founder on its own.
The second separationist mandate is that religion is irrelevant to
citizenship or political participation. This second mandate overlaps to
some extent with the first, in the sense that individual citizens may not be
prohibited from participating in governmental affairs or running for
office because of their religious beliefs. But the second mandate goes
further than the first in that it also prohibits government endorsements of
religion that have the effect of skewing the political process in favor of
believers or members of favored sects. This mandate was the basis for
Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis, especially as it was applied to
government use of religious symbols and principles in official settings or
24activities. She was even willing to apply this mandate where private
religious speech occurred in a context in which it would be viewed by a
reasonable observer as being too closely associated with the
25government. The key to this analysis was to prevent the government
from communicating either overtly or sub rosa that religion could be the
basis for identifying any citizens as political insiders or political
outsiders. Under a proper separationist interpretation of the First
Amendment, religion is simply irrelevant to one's status in society.
of every school day in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(prohibiting the inclusion of an official prayer at the beginning of every school day
in public schools).
21. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional student-led prayer at public school football games).
22. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (alteration added).
23. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1961), reprinted in Philip B. Kurland, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF
CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962) (describing Kurland's theory
of strict neutrality).
24. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
25. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
[Vol. 5
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The first two separationist mandates lead to a third, which is that
in the American constitutional system religion is a private matter, not a
collective matter subject to government influence or control. Opponents
of the separation principle frequently criticized the privatization of
religion as discriminatory, in that it denies to religious proponents who
form a political majority the ability to write their views into law in the
same fashion as other, nonreligious political factions are permitted to
26write their policy preferences into law. The answer to this criticism
ultimately has to depend on the recognition of the broader policy choice
of having an Establishment Clause. in the Constitution at all. Whatever
precise notions the founders had of the meaning of "establishment," the
undeniable fact is that they singled out religion for constitutional
limitations of a sort that they applied to no other category of government
action. The reason for this has been succinctly summarized by Kathleen
Sullivan as the "social contract produced -by religious truce. 27
Regardless of the accuracy of the historical judgment that religion poses
special dangers for a stable democratic political system, it is clear that
religious groups have gotten a great deal from the separationist bargain
that denies them access to political power to impose their religious views
on nonadherents. In exchange for giving up political power, religious
practitioners have obtained the virtually unfettered freedom to practice
their faith in ways that would be unimaginable in the absence of the
Establishment Clause. Foregoing the need to constantly monitor the
political status of one's religious affiliation frees up substantial time and
26. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
27. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion andLiberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
195, 197 (1992).
[T]he exclusion of religion from public programs is not, as
[Michael] McConnell would have it, an invidious
"preference for the secular in public affairs." Secular
governance of public affairs is simply an entailment of the
settlement by the Establishment Clause of the war of all
sects against all. From the perspective of the prepolitical
war of all sects against all, the exclusion of any religion
from public affairs looks like "discrimination." But from
the perspective of the settlement worked by the
Establishment Clause, it looks like proper treatment.
Id. at 198-99 (alterations added) (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 169).
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resources that can be devoted to the primary spiritual objectives of the
religious enterprise.
The fourth separationist mandate is also a logical corollary of the
first two. The fourth mandate states that in addition to being prohibited
from favoring a particular sect, the government is also prohibited from in
any way favoring, privileging, or advancing religion in general. Among
other things, this means (although the Court has always been reluctant to
emphasize it) that atheism is a perfectly respectable "religious"
perspective. The Constitution protects a person's right to be an atheist,
agnostic, or religiously indifferent to exactly the same extent as it
protects a person's right to join the Catholic or Methodist churches. If
questions about a person's lack of faith arise in a political or
governmental context, the proper constitutional response is that the
28
subject is none of the government's (or the general public's) business.
The final separationist mandate is that limitations on government
religious activity are largely a matter of national, rather than local
concern. At first glance this is a commonplace implication of the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment. But at least one member of the Supreme Court,2 9 and a
new wave of revisionist academics, 30 argue that the incorporation of the
First Amendment should not be considered a foregone conclusion, but
rather a fundamental misinterpretation of the Amendment itself. Under
this interpretation, the First Amendment was really supposed to facilitate,
rather than prevent state religious establishments.
3 1
There are several problems with this interpretation. First, as a
matter of historical analysis it almost entirely devalues the evolution in
28. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (overturning a Maryland
statute requiring notaries to profess a belief in the existence of God and concluding
that "neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person
'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion' (citation omitted)).
29. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The text and history of the Establishment
Clause strongly suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent
Congress from interfering with state establishments.").
30. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 36-39 (1998); STEVEN D.
SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 22-26 (1995); STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
PRIDE OF REASON 31-47 (1998).
31. See generally AMAR, supra note 30; SMITH, QUEST, supra note 30; SMITH,
PRIDE OF REASON, supra note 30.
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public perception of establishment reflected in the changes to the
political structure wrought by the passage of the Fourteenth
32Amendment. Second, as a matter of constitutional theory and doctrine,
this interpretation would threaten to undermine religious freedom in fully
one-third of the states. Religious demographics are a key reason to fear
the devolution to the states of the issue of religious establishment. In
many ways this is the most religiously diverse country on earth.
Religious diversity in the United States, however, is a phenomenon
reflected primarily in the nation as a whole and in its major urban
centers. But most people do not live in the nation as a whole or in New
York City or Los Angeles. In this country, religion, like politics, is
largely a local affair, and the simple fact is that on a local level most of
the country is overwhelmingly dominated by one or a few sects.33
Serious attacks on the liberty of religious minorities will inevitably ensue
if the separationist principle is written out of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in favor of the integrationist system described below.
Under this new system, local religious majorities may use local
government to acknowledge their dominance in various ways, including
32. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The
Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (discussing
the changes in public attitudes toward the Establishment Clause during the period
between the adoption of the Bill of Rights and the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
33. This conclusion is based on the statistics compiled in the recent American
Religious Identification Survey. See Barry A. Kosmin, Egon Mayer, & Ariela
Keysar, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, American
Religious Identification Survey at 38 (2001) [hereinafter ARIS 2001 Study],
available at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/researchstudies/aris.pdf. According to
these statistics, fifteen states have thirty-five percent or more of their populations
identifying with one sect and have no other sect reporting identification rates within
twenty percentage points of the dominant sect. See ARIS 2001 Study at 39-42
(compiling religious identification statistics for forty-eight mainland states and the
District of Columbia). This view of religious domination takes into account only
individual sects at the statewide level. Effective religious domination is undoubtedly
greater than this due to the likelihood that in some areas similar sects who are
counted separately in the ARIS survey (Southern Baptists, conservative Methodists,
and Pentecostals, for example) will often act jointly in the political arena to pursue
issues of common sectarian interest. It is also quite likely that large rural areas of
many states will be dominated by one or a small number of sects, even if the varied
religious demographics in those states' urban areas produce substantial religious
diversity in the statewide statistics.
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both government financing and symbolic endorsement of the majority's
particular sectarian perspective. In such a system, religious minorities
will be more vulnerable to subtle (and frankly not so subtle) religious
coercion than they have been at any time in recent memory. The next
section describes the details of this new church/state paradigm.
II. THE COURT'S NEW THEORY OF CHURCH/STATE INTEGRATION
Although the opponents of the Court's existing Establishment
Clause jurisprudence have spent most of their energy critiquing the
concept of separation of church and state, they have also provided a
fairly detailed roadmap of the post-separationist constitutional landscape.
What follows in this section is a nonexhaustive list of several
propositions that will form the basis of the new paradigm of church/state
integration. The next section will then discuss how these principles are
likely to affect the Establishment Clause doctrine that lower courts will
use to implement the new regime. The final section will discuss whether
anything will be left of the Establishment Clause after the new theory is
fully implemented.
A. American Political Values are Infused with and Defined by Religion
The most basic thesis supporting the new integrationist
perspective on the Establishment Clause is that the political culture of the
United States is both infused with and defined by religion. This
proposition has two components, one historical and the other theoretical.
The historical variation on this theme is that the country's
political culture has always been marked by specific references to
religion. Proponents of the integrationist perspective never tire of
pointing out the many ways in which the political branches endorsed or
financed religion in the early days of the Republic. Instances of early
religious endorsement by the government that are frequently cited by the
Court's church/state integrationists include presidential declarations of
thanksgiving and prayer, legislative prayers and government-financed
34. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 101-02 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (citing presidential
proclamations as evidence that "[o]ur history is replete with official references to the
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• 35
chaplains, John Marshall's decision to open Supreme Court sessions
with the invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court,, 36 and government-financed programs providing sectarian
education for children belonging to Native American tribes.3 7 These
members of the Court also cite more recent evidence of sectarian
influence over government, including the congressional authorization of
National Days of Prayer38 and the addition of the words "under God" to
the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954. 39 These varied historical references
are used to bolster the integrationists' main objective, which is to
undermine the "demonstrably false principle that the government cannot
favor religion over irreligion.
40
There are numerous problems with these historical accounts.
One problem is Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson is problematic for the
church/state integrationists for several reasons. First, Jefferson wrote the
separationist Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in which
he derided:
the impious presumption of legislators and rulers,
civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being
themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have
assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting
up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the
only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to
impose them on others, hath established and
maintained false religions over the greatest part of
the world and through all time .... "
value and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders") (alteration added).
35. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) ("It is clear that neither
the seventeen draftsmen of the Constitution who were Members of the First
Congress, nor the Congress of 1789, saw any establishment problem in the
employment of congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress, a
practice that has continued for nearly two centuries.").
36. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
37. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 103-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677, n.5 (citing congressional proclamations).
39. Id. at 676.
40. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 251-52 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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Second, while serving as President, Jefferson refused to issue a
religious Thanksgiving Proclamation, on the ground that "[e]very
religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for these
exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their own
particular tenets; and this right can never be safer than in their own
hands, where the Constitution has deposited it."
42
Perhaps most importantly, however, President Jefferson authored
the infamous Letter to the Danbury Baptists. In this letter Jefferson
adapted to secular ends the "wall of separation" metaphor coined earlier
by the founder of the first Baptist church in America, Roger Williams.43
Jefferson argued that in adopting the First Amendment the American
people built "a wall of separation between Church and State."" The
"wall of separation" metaphor has long generated the ire of church/state
integrationists of all stripes, whose attitude toward the metaphor was
summarized in the Alabama silent prayer case by then-Justice Rehnquist:
"It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's
misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. 45 The integrationists' tack in
explaining away the inconvenient views of one of the foremost thinkers
on church and state in the early republic is first to diminish the
46importance of the documents themselves, and then to quietly erase
Jefferson's name from the list of Framers whose intent is relevant to
determining the meaning of the First Amendment.47
42. 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.,
1904) (alteration added).
43. See infra note 173.
44. Jefferson, Letter to Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 303.
45. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Id. ("[Jefferson's] letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short
note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress.")
(alteration added).
47. Id. ("Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the
constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress
and ratified by the States .... He would seem to any detached observer as a less than
ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment.")
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But Jefferson is not the only Framer presenting problems for
those trying to construct a historical justification for church/state
integration. Another problem for the new church/state integrationists is
the separationist views of the author of the First Amendment himself,
James Madison. Madison was instrumental in erecting separationist
legal barriers to religious establishments in Virginia, by shepherding
Jefferson's Bill for Religious Freedom through the Virginia legislature.
In the context of that battle between separationists and integrationists, he
wrote one of the most vociferous defenses of the separation of church
and state in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Establishments.48 The Memorial is key because it goes beyond the
precise legal details of the particular dispute over Virginia law to set
forth most of the basic arguments in favor of separation of church and
state in general. Many of Madison's arguments harshly criticize the
religious groups that have historically benefited from the integration of
church and state.49 Madison's tone is at times intemperate. It would be
difficult to conceive of any modem political figure publishing these
portions of the Memorial today for fear that they would be derided as
insensitive and hostile to religion. Those who do not particularly care for
Madison's separationist views prefer to treat the Madison who wrote the
Memorial as a different person than the Madison who wrote the First
Amendment. 50 But Madison himself wrote in his later life about these
issues in a way that indicates clearly that his views on the separation of
church and state did not change over time. It is simply implausible to
claim, as Justice Thomas does,5 that the person who wrote that
ecclesiastical establishments have a tendency to "erect a spiritual tyranny
48. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947).
49. See, e.g., infra note 183.
50. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 97-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("On the basis of
the record of these proceedings in the House of Representatives, James Madison was
undoubtedly the most important architect among the Members of the House of the
Amendments which became the Bill of Rights, but it was James Madison speaking
as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of
incorporating the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States
Constitution."). For a critique of Rehnquist's historical discussion in Wallace, see
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1985-86).
51. See supra note 29.
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on the ruins of Civil authority '52 also intended the First Amendment to
facilitate state establishments of religion.
On the other hand, if one ignores the views of the separationist
Framers and focuses instead on historical circumstances supporting
church/state integration, then the historical argument turns out to be
equally problematic because it proves too much. The historical data that
might support the claim that church/state integration was commonly
accepted in the United States at the time of the framing does not support
the kind of ecumenical, big-tent religious establishments favored by the
modem integrationists on the Court. Rather, if read honestly, the thrust
of the data indicating a close relationship between religion and politics in
the early republic would support a highly sectarian Protestant
establishment.53 In this, as in many other respects, the new church/state
integrationists try to have it both ways. They cite history to support their
attacks on separationist views of the Establishment Clause, but they then
ignore the parts of this history that contradict their efforts to allay the
fears that their alternative paradigm will produce discrimination,
religious coercion, and social disruption along sectarian lines of a sort
not seen in this country in decades.
Given the many problems with the historical support for a
benign, ecumenical religious establishment, modem church/state
integrationists usually bolster their historical arguments with theoretical
claims. The theoretical argument is that the Framers frequently enlisted
religion to bolster their political goals and aspirations because religion
was (and is) an indispensable component of the country's basic political
values. "Those who wrote the Constitution believed that morality was
essential to the well-being of society and that encouragement of religion
was the best way to foster morality. 54 The academic version of this
52. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in Everson, 330
U.S. at 68.
53. See infra note 152 and accompanying text; see also McCreary County v.
ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005) ("[H]istory shows that the religion of
concern to the Framers was not that of the monotheistic faiths generally, but
Christianity in particular, a fact that no member of this Court takes as a premise
for construing the Religion Clauses .... The Framers would, therefore, almost
certainly object to the dissent's unstated reasoning that because Christianity was
a monotheistic "religion," monotheism with Mosaic antecedents should be a
touchstone of establishment interpretation) (alteration added).
54. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2749 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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position has been articulated by Michael McConnell and others.55 The
gist of this position is that without some external source of public value
or civic virtue, all liberal democracies are little more than empty
proceduralist shells, because they have no way of identifying or selecting
among society's larger social objectives. Thus, liberal democracies
require "mediating institutions" such as churches to give society meaning
56and direction. Religion is the means "by which the citizens in a liberal
polity learn to transcend their individual interests and opinions and...• , , 57
develop civic responsibility. Along similar lines, Professor Chip Lupu
has argued that the focus on rationality and analytic empiricism that is at
the heart of the separationist Establishment Clause paradigm is not
"particularly conducive to the life of the spirit, without which it may not
be possible for a nation to thrive.,
58
Another variation on this theme is that all political policy
determinations involve value choices, and prohibiting religious
practitioners from basing political decisions on their religious values
unfairly discriminates against religious practitioners and installs
secularism as the defining national ideology.5 9 Justice Thomas has also
claimed that discrimination against religious practitioners is behind the
Court's historic refusal to permit the government to finance pervasively
sectarian institutions such as religious schools: "[T]he application of the
'pervasively sectarian' factor collides with our decisions that have
prohibited governments from discriminating in the distribution of public
benefits based upon religious status or sincerity. 60  Surprisingly, the
claim that separationist interpretations of the Establishment Clause
discriminate against religion and religious practitioners does not only
emanate from religious conservatives such as Judge McConnell and
Justice Thomas. Some politically progressive academics have made
55. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT.
REV. 1.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id.
58. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 230, 279 (1993).
59. Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious
Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REv.
639, 640-41.
60. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion) (alteration
added).
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similar claims in recent years. After arguing for many years in favor of
the separationist mandate against religiously motivated legislation,
Michael Perry has recently argued that the constitutional prohibition of
religiously based legislation "deprivilege[s] religious faith, relative to
secular belief, as a ground of moral judgment.",61 Along the same lines,
Professor Douglas Laycock criticizes proponents of what he terms "so-
called separationism," whose "defining commitment seems to be to
secular supremacy and religious subordination, or at least to religious
• , . • ,,62
marginalization.
There are many problems with these arguments. The
discrimination argument, for example, depends on the highly disputable
assumption that democratic governance is predicated on the right of the
political majority to exercise its power with regard to the very sensitive
subject of religion. The argument is that a constitutional limit on the
exercise of that sort of power "discriminates" against the religious by
denying them the fruits of their political success. But this sort of
limitation on political victors occurs frequently in constitutional
litigation. Segregationists who comprised a large majority of the voting
population of the South in the 1960s were prohibited from exercising
their political clout by legally mandating segregation; today, broad
majorities favoring the death penalty may only carry out their policy
desires in conformance with strict constitutional limits imposed by due
process and cruel and unusual punishment strictures; and despite the
broad social revulsion directed toward the likes of Larry Flynt, his
socially unpalatable salacious satires receive the same constitutional
63protection as the country's most esteemed establishment newspapers.
Majorities cannot do everything they want in a constitutional democracy,
even with regard to implementing their most revered and widely shared
values.
61. MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 30 (2003) (alteration added).
62. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43, 47 (1997).
63. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (holding that the
First Amendment protects salacious political satire under the standard of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), which protects criticism of public
figures even when embodied in "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks").
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As for the notion that liberal democracy cannot exist without
some source of civic virtue and deep value, this proposition also asserts a
dubious view of the constitutional framework of our political system. In
fact, as Justice Jackson famously reminded us, "[i]f there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.' 64 Contrary to the theoretical claim at the heart of the
integrationist paradigm, collective assertions of eternal social ideals and
beliefs, attempts to formulate a uniform set of public values, and even the
very concept of civic virtue itself are all deeply incompatible with the
basic proposition that our system exists to accommodate a range of
different, and even conflicting concepts of ultimate goods. Even if this
were not true as a theoretical matter, it is certainly true as a practical
matter. Any attempt in the United States today to identify and reach
consensus about an ultimate set of religious ideals is doomed at the
outset to fail. The integrationists implicitly recognize this by subtly
shifting their focus in the second component of the integrationist
paradigm from the pursuit of unity through common values to the
imposition of religious majoritarianism.
B. The Salient Religious Values are Those of the Political Majority
There is very little in the realm of religious faith and spiritual
verities that Protestants, Jews, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists, agnostics,
and atheists can agree upon. Even the most basic issues are subject to
acrimonious dispute, including the validity of particular religious texts,
the existence or nonexistence of a supreme being (or supreme beings),
the mechanisms for communicating with the deity (or deities), and the
role of the institutional church. The church/state integrationists
understand this, and respond by emphasizing that the salient religious
values that the government is allowed to endorse and advance are the
65
specific values of the religious majonty.
This conclusion follows directly from the historical and
theoretical premises of the first component of -the integrationist
64. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (alteration
added).
65. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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paradigm. If the Establishment Clause permits the government to act
religiously because of the country's religious history, then the logical
reference point to determine the content of that history must be the
specific views of the historical actors in question. The views of these
actors therefore define the religious activity in which the government is
permitted to engage. As Justice Scalia once argued, the constitutional
issue does not turn on "the abstract philosophical question whether the
alternative of frustrating this desire of a religious majority is to be
preferred over the alternative of imposing ...a feeling of exclusion,
upon nonbelievers," but rather the historical fact that the "age-old
practices of our people" indicate that the Constitution favors the religious
66majority. Therefore, Scalia later argued, if the historical actors are
monotheistic, then the government is allowed to advance the religious• 67
cause of monotheism. Likewise, if as a theoretical matter religion is
necessary to stabilize and orient the political structure, then the
government must be allowed to select specific religious values to
advance as the official version of civic virtue. Since all religions do not
have the same values, some religions must win and others must lose.
Thus, just as the church/state integrationists attempt to exclude
Jefferson from the group of Framers whose views define the meaning of
the Establishment Clause, they also specifically advocate the "disregard"
(to use Justice Scalia's phrase)68 of people who belong to groups other
than major traditional monotheistic religions. Although Justice Scalia is
the only member of the Court brazen enough to actually say this in so
many words, the fact is that any integrationist perspective is by its very
nature exclusionary. Even the generic and seemingly insignificant
slogan "In God we Trust" has at its center a concept that significant
numbers of Americans cannot embrace. The worship of a single God is
simply not an agenda to which Hindus, Buddhists, Wiccans, agnostics, or
atheists can sign on. From the perspective of these groups, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals was clearly correct in asserting that "[a]
profession that we are a nation 'under God' is identical, for
Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession that we are a nation
'under Jesus,' a nation 'under Vishnu,' a nation 'under Zeus,' or a nation
66. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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'under no god,' because none of these professions can be neutral with,. • ,,69
respect to religion. If even the most diluted and nonspecific religious
concept cannot obtain unanimous consent of all religious groups, then
the entire project of achieving unanimous consent for any government
religious activity is doomed. It is inevitable that religious groups
associated with the political majority will be granted official favor and
members of other religious groups will be relegated to outsider status.
According to the second component of the integrationist paradigm, this
religious exclusivity is permissible under a properly construed
Establishment Clause.
C. Religion is Relevant to Political Participation
A second logical corollary of the historical and theoretical
arguments in favor of church/state integration is that under an
integrationist regime, a person's religion will be considered relevant to
that person's status in the political system. If we accept the integrationist
premises that this country is historically a religious enterprise, and that
religion provides a necessary undergirding of all legitimate political
policies, then it is fair to doubt that a person who is not religious (or a
person who is a member of an outsider religious group) is qualified to
contribute anything desirable to the political process. If the country
historically has been governed by religious practitioners, then someone
who does not practice religion may fairly be seen as lacking a central
attribute that has historically been viewed as a key qualification for
political office. Likewise, if religion is necessary to provide the civic
virtue that leads to the development of wise public policy, then we can
assume that anyone who has not imbibed the requisite number of
religious values is not sufficiently virtuous to govern.
None of this is intended to suggest that the new integrationists
would invalidate the "no religious test" clause of Art. VI of the
Constitution,7° or uphold a specific religious qualification for office. But
the logic of the integrationist paradigm could lead an integrationist court
to approve a number of actions by the government and its officials that
69. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on
standing grounds, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (alteration added).
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("no religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office or public trust under the United States").
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stop short of an overt requirement that political candidates join a
particular church. For example, under an integrationist regime
government officials could be allowed to participate openly (that is, in
their role as government officials) in religious ceremonies and other
sectarian affairs. Government officials could be permitted to comment
(again, while acting in their official roles) on the religious practices of
candidates for office. They could even be permitted to publish an
official government version of Christian Coalition-style voter
information cards referring to the religious beliefs and practices of
candidates. Under the same theory, the government could join with
churches to provide an appropriate spiritual background for public
officials and staff, and government programs could incorporate the
assumption that a religious component of government-financed social
programs is necessary in order to better accomplish the goals of those
71programs.
In effect, as long as the government stops short of mandating
specific religious practices as a condition of providing government
services, the government could do everything else in its power to bolster
the current public prejudice that forces political candidates to
demonstrate some basic level of conformity with mainstream religious
faith before being elected to office. As a practical matter, it is doubtful
that an avowed atheist or an agnostic could be elected to any political
office in most parts of the country; under an integrationist regime, the
government would be allowed to translate into official government
policy that common form of religious prejudice.
One possible response to this claim is that even if the assumption
that nonbelievers could not be elected to office is true, the Establishment
Clause is not violated because its strictures do not apply to voters. The
unwillingness of an overwhelmingly religious public to vote for someone
who does not share its faith does not violate the Establishment Clause
because voters are not state actors. But even if the Establishment Clause
71. The Court has already approved a form of this sort of religious favoritism
in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1988) (approving a federal family
planning act that provided funding to religious organizations, and noting that "these
provisions of the statute reflect at most Congress' considered judgment that religious
organizations can help solve the problems to which the [act] is addressed. ...
Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress from making such a judgment or
from recognizing the important part that religion or religious organizations may play
in resolving certain secular problems." (citation omitted)).
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does not apply to the actual decisions of voters, government actions that
subtly reinforce the voters' religious prejudice in favor of members of
approved religious faiths nevertheless implicate Establishment Clause
values. Even if we are not as tolerant of religious outsiders as our social
mythology would have us believe, the myth of tolerance for religious
diversity creates the conditions under which the reality of tolerance for
religious diversity may eventually flourish. This myth was fostered by a
separationist paradigm in which the government may not send "a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community., 72 The
separationist paradigm instills in society an aspiration that is highly
conducive to religious peace among a diverse population-an aspiration
which has at its center the proposition that a person's religious beliefs (or
lack thereof) are irrelevant to that person's status as a citizen.
Proponents of a system that rejects this proposition must also
acknowledge their willingness to forego the religious peace that has
always been one of the most important goals of church/state separation.
D. Religion is a Collective Phenomenon
One consequence of implementing the first three components of
the new integrationist paradigm is that religion will become a collective
rather than an individual phenomenon. That is, the precise details that
make religion politically significant will become subject to social
determination. Sets of beliefs that do not fit the socially determined
model of religion may still be recognized as "religious" for some
purposes (application of the Free Exercise Clause, for example), but such
disfavored faiths will be viewed by the public as secondary to the main
enterprise of religion as represented by the government-approved
mainstream belief systems. Thus, there will be a collectively determined
hierarchy of faiths, in which favored religions will be certified by the
government and used to instill preferred values to the citizenry and
others will be merely tolerated, in much the same way that we tolerate
Holmes' "man [who] says that he has squared the circle[.]"73  The
72. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(alterations added).
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message this will send to adherents (and potential adherents) of the
secondary faiths will be one of subordination and insignificance.
As usual, Justice Scalia has already provided both a model of
how this process of collectivizing religion will work, and a series of
justifications for the creation of a government-certified hierarchy of
faiths. As a model for how this system will work, recall Justice Scalia's
distinction between socially accepted monotheistic faith and every other
type of religious belief.74  In Scalia's world, socially approved
monotheistic faiths will have their symbols and belief systems endorsed
by the government and incorporated into government programs; the
others can be "disregarded., 75  As for justifying the new religious
hierarchy, Scalia describes a mutually reinforcing system in which
religion does not really serve its true function unless it is incorporated
into a social matrix, and the government cannot act legitimately unless it
first bows to the superior power of the approved deity:
Religious men and women of almost all
denominations have felt it necessary to
acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a
people, and not just as individuals, because they
believe in the 'protection of divine Providence,' as
the Declaration of Independence put it, not just for
76individuals but for societies ....
Other courts have described a similar phenomenon.77 What all
this means for the obstinate adherents of disfavored faiths depends on
how far the new integrationists follow their logic. At the very least,
religious minorities and nonreligious persons are given the same
instructions Justice Scalia would have given to Deborah Weisman: when
74. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek Iridep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) (upholding a student-led prayer at a
public high school graduation ceremony and noting to dissenters that "[b]y attending
graduation to experience and participate in the community's display of support for
the graduates, people should not be surprised to find the event affected by
community standards" (alteration added)).
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confronted with the government's celebration of the dominant religion,
78sit down, be quiet, or leave the premises.
E. The Establishment Clause Prohibits only the Most Egregious Forms
of Religious Coercion
Just as Justice Scalia's Lee v. Weisman dissent provides the
lesson for how religious minorities are forced to deal with the majority's
use of government to express its faith in public ceremonies, the opinion
indicates how the concept of religious coercion will be addressed in the
new church/state integrationist regime. The main debate between
Justices Kennedy and Scalia in Lee v. Weisman pertained to the meaning
of coercion. Both Justices recognized that religious coercion would
violate the Establishment Clause, but they disagreed vehemently on what
the term "coercion" means.
To Justice Scalia, "coercion" means quite literally the "coercion
of religious orthodoxy and . . . financial support by force of law and
threat of penalty."' 9 To Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, coercion
encompasses other, much more subtle, forms of social pressures that are
encouraged or facilitated by the government. In his majority opinion
striking down a brief, ecumenical prayer at a public school graduation
ceremony, Kennedy noted that to the objecting student "attendance and
participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real
sense obligatory, though the school district does not require attendance
as a condition for receipt of the diploma. ' 80 The coercive element was
the social pressure that was brought to bear on the dissenter when a
prayer that is favored by a majority of participants is included in the state
ceremony:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's
supervision and control of a high school graduation
ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer
78. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To deprive our society of
that important unifying mechanism [of religion] in order to spare the nonbeliever
what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing, or even sitting in
respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law."
(alteration added)).
79. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)..
80. Id. at 586.
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pressure, on attending students to stand as a group
or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
invocation and benediction. This pressure, though
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt
81compulsion.
Thus, at least in the public school context where juveniles are
involved, social pressure becomes unconstitutional coercion, even if it is
not approved by the state, and (as a later school prayer case
demonstrated) even if the decision to have the prayer is that of the
students rather than the government actors.
82
Justice Kennedy displays extraordinary sensitivity to religious
minorities in his opinion in Lee v. Weisman. In explaining why
defending the Establishment Clause rights of the dissenter did not
infringe on the free speech or free exercise rights of the majority, Justice
Kennedy noted that there was no equivalent to the Establishment Clause
regarding any other topic on which the government might act or speak.
Religion was singled out for special restrictions, Kennedy noted, because
our history has taught us that
in the hands of government, what might begin as a
tolerant expression of religious views may end in a
policy to indoctrinate and coerce. A state-created
orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief
and conscience which are the sole assurance that
83religious faith is real, not imposed.
Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy has not applied that lesson to
any context other than religious exercises involving juveniles at public
schools. Indeed, in a long string of cases involving official endorsements
of religion outside the public school context, Kennedy has been among
the Court's most consistent supporters of the government's ability to
engage in religious activity. 84  He has argued that limiting the
81. Id. at 593.
82. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding
unconstitutional student-led prayer at public school football games).
83. Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92.
84. In addition to his opinion in Allegheny County, which is discussed at infra
notes 85-88 and accompanying text, Kennedy voted to uphold the constitutionality
of both official Ten Commandments displays in Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854
(2005), and McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), and also
joined the plurality's very lenient treatment of Establishment Clause restrictions on
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government's ability to endorse religion might amount to• • 85
unconstitutional discrimination against religion. In one opinion written
early in his tenure on the Court, Justice Kennedy criticized the contention
that the Establishment Clause prohibited the government from favoring
86either religion in general or particular sects.
Taken to its logical extreme, some of the language quoted above
would require a relentless extirpation of all contact between government
and religion. But that is not the history or the purpose of the
Establishment Clause. Government policies of accommodation,
acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our
political and cultural heritage.
87
This stance puts Kennedy directly in line with the other
church/state integrationists on the Court in believing that "the
Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing
and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society" 88-at
least outside of the schools, and presumably limited by a Scalia-style
narrow coercion protection against the imposition of direct legal
sanctions on religious dissenters.
As discussed in Sections III and IV, infra, the adoption of this
position would effectively render the Establishment Clause redundant,
given the protections already offered against direct religious coercion by
the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, this result is unavoidable if the Court's new integrationist
majority is to achieve its stated goal of reinvigorating the religious
aspects of public culture. As Justice Kennedy recognized in his early
endorsement opinion in Allegheny County, diluting the Establishment
Clause to the point of a narrow coercion standard is necessary if the
private religious speech on public property in Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
85. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that any other approach "would border on latent hostility toward
religion, as it would require government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge
only the secular, to the exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious").
86. Id. at 662 (arguing that "where the government's act of recognition or
accommodation (of religion] is passive and symbolic.., any intangible benefit to
religion is unlikely to present a realistic risk of establishment" (alteration added)).
87. Id. at 657.
88. Id.
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Court's new majority is going to permit the government to endorse
religion and finance religious activity-activities that Justice Kennedy
has repeatedly voted to uphold.89 Any attempt to extend beyond the
school context Justice Kennedy's Lee v. Weisman-style recognition that
government endorsement of religion unconstitutionally facilitates
religious coercion through social ostracism would derail the project of
church/state integration. Church/state integration and effective coercion
of religious dissenters are intertwined phenomena. Justice Kennedy has
already chosen the church/state integration side in the grand theoretical
debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause; the only good
news for separationists is that Justice Kennedy cannot bring himself to
apply the logic of that choice to schoolchildren.
F. Private Religious Expression is Protected and Encouraged, Even in
Government-Controlled Contexts
The sixth component of the integrationist paradigm involves the
application of the Establishment Clause to private religious speech that
occurs on government property, in government facilities, or in close
conjunction with government activities. This component of the paradigm
will apply in two common situations. First, it will apply in the public
school context when teachers or students seek to express their religious
ideas in a classroom atmosphere where officially sanctioned religious
activity would be impermissible. Second, it will apply outside the school
context when adults seek to place religious symbols on public property,
or otherwise engage in religious speech or activity in conjunction with
official government business or in close proximity to government
facilities.
In the Court's decisions involving examples of this scenario in
public schools, the separationist paradigm has prevailed in the sense that
a majority of the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to limit
ostensibly private religious speech that occurs in conjunction with an
official public school activity. Arguments in favor of permitting private
religious speech in public schools appeared in some of the Supreme
Court's earliest religion-in-public-school cases. In Abington School
89. See, e.g., Zelman v. Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), and Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000), in which Justice Kennedy voted with the integrationist
majority to uphold both government financing schemes.
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District v. Schempp9° for example, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania
program under which students could select and read over the school
intercom ten passages from any version of the Bible that he or she chose.
Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that "there is involved in these cases a
substantial free exercise claim on the part of those who affirmatively
desire to have their children's school day open with the reading of
passages from the Bible." 91 To prohibit students who want to engage in
religious speech at the beginning of the school day from doing so,
Stewart argued, would not only place religion "at an artificial and state-
created disadvantage," it would approach an "establishment of a religion
of secularism, or at the least, as government support of the beliefs of
those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in
private." 2
Despite the failure of this argument to carry the day in Schempp,
many school systems have continued to use some form of this argument
in attempting to circumvent the Court's consistent refusal to permit
prayer at public school events. Most recently, the Court rejected a small
Texas town's effort to permit student prayers before public high school
football games. 93 The school officials argued that the restrictions usually
imposed on prayer in public schools should not apply to their football
game prayers because the students leading the prayer were chosen by a
vote of the other students instead of the school officials themselves.94
The school argued that the principles of the Court's school prayer cases
did not apply to them "because the messages are private student speech,
not public speech," and because "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses protect. '  The Court rejected these
arguments, in an opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, on the grounds that
the school board had constructed a system of choosing the student to give
the prayer that effectively guaranteed that "minority candidates will
90. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
91. Id. at 312 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
94. Id. at 302.
95. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, J.)).
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never prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced." 96 Thus,
under current doctrine, even private religious speech is constitutionally
problematic if it occurs in a socially coercive atmosphere that the
government has a hand in creating.
The Supreme Court has allowed arguments in favor of private
religious speech to overcome Establishment Clause limits in the public
school context only where the claims have involved speakers getting
access to public school facilities after-hours, in situations in which the
facilities have already been designated as public forums for other types
of private speech. 97 In these cases, however, the Court has been careful
to emphasize that the government must take care to prevent the private
religious group from infiltrating the regular school day, conveying the
government's endorsement of the religious activity, or otherwise
infringing on the right of other students to be free of unwanted religious
98proselytizing.
Justice Kennedy's willingness to join the separationist Justices in
limiting private religious speech in public schools means that the
application of the sixth component of the integrationist paradigm will
produce inconsistent results inside and outside the public school context.
Thus, cases implicating the sixth component of the integrationist
paradigm will track the cases implicating the fifth component of the
paradigm; in both sets of cases Justice Kennedy's broad interpretation of
the concept of coercion in the public school context will deny his
96. Id. at 304.
97. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993) (allowing church group to use a school auditorium that had been used for
similar expressive purposes by a wide range of other speakers); Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (upholding the Equal Access Act, which permitted religious groups to use
school facilities after-hours, where the facilities had been opened up for a range of
different expressive purposes); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (allowing
religious group at a public university to use school property for meetings on the
same terms as other student groups).
98. The Court has been especially careful to prevent participation in the
religious activity by school officials such as teachers. See Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 117 (2001) ("[W]hen individuals who are not
schoolteachers are giving lessons after school to children permitted to attend only
with parental consent, the concerns [about coercion] expressed [previously] are not
present." (alterations added)); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253 ("Under the Act, . . . faculty
monitors may not participate in any religious meetings, and nonschool persons may
not direct, control, or regularly attend activities of student groups.").
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integrationist colleagues the same leeway to permit extensive religious
activity in schools that Kennedy is willing to grant them in cases arising
in the adult world. But the survival of this sliver of separationist doctrine
may be short-lived, since the other four integrationists on the Court are
almost certainly willing to loosen (or even remove) Establishment Clause
restrictions on private religious speech in public schools. Indeed, during
his tenure as a court of appeals judge, Justice Alito wrote two opinions
that specifically utilize the "private speech" model to permit the infusion
of religion into public school classrooms. 99 Thus, one more strategic
change in Court personnel could spell the demise of even the
Establishment Clause protections of children in the captive atmosphere
of a schoolroom.
Outside the public schools, the situation is much clearer, and the
integrationist model probably already has majority support on the Court.
Justice Kennedy does not display the same hesitation to permit the
joinder of private religious speech and government action in the adult
world that he exhibits in the public school cases. Thus, once the
church/state integration paradigm is fully implemented, the Court is
likely to permit private religious speech in public facilities, on public
property, and in conjunction with government-sponsored events-
without regard to the fact that the religious speech will often be so
intertwined with the government that a neutral observer would view the
religious speech as having been endorsed by the government, and
without regard to the fact that the private religious speech may dominate
the government forum or activity. Indeed, three of the five church/state
integrationists have already so held in Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette,1°° and every indication is that the two new
Justices will join them in expanding the scope of permissible private
religious activity in these situations.
In Pinette, the question was whether various private groups
could erect a series of Latin crosses in a government-owned plaza
surrounding the statehouse in Ohio.101 Four Justices-including Justices
99. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist.,
386 F.3d 514, 518 (3d Cir. 2004) (supporting religious group's ability to distribute
religious materials at "Back-to-School nights"); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d
198, 210 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting) (supporting public school students'
right "to express religious views in class discussion or in assigned work").
100. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
101. Id. at 757.
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Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist-ruled
that the crosses did not violate the Establishment Clause, and that the
Constitution did not require an independent assessment of the religious
impact of a display in a public forum. According to the opinion of these
four Justices, "[r]eligious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal
terms."'10 2 Although Justice O'Connor also was willing to permit the
particular display at issue in Pinette, she objected that the plurality's
standard would effectively gut the Establishment Clause by permitting
private religious activity that occurs in such close conjunction with the
government that a reasonable observer would perceive an official
endorsement of religion. 103 In response, Justice O'Connor noted that
under the traditional understanding of the Establishment Clause,
[t]he Clause is more than a negative prohibition
against certain narrowly defined forms of
government favoritism . . ; it also imposes
affirmative obligations that may require a State, in
some situations, to take steps to avoid being
perceived as supporting or endorsing a private
religious message. That is, the Establishment
Clause forbids a State to hide behind the
application of formally neutral criteria and remain
studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions. 104
Under the sixth part of the integrationist paradigm, the Court
would abandon this traditional understanding in favor of a hollow
neutrality premise. In other words, if all religious groups are given the
same opportunity to use public spaces and official ceremonies to advance
their faith, it is not a constitutional problem if the dominant faith happens
to appear more often. In effect, this approach allows the government to
privatize its Establishment Clause violations. As Justice Souter
summarized the problems with this approach in Pinette: "By allowing
government to encourage what it cannot do on its own, the proposed per
102. Id. at 770 (plurality opinion) (alteration added).
103. Id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
104. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (alteration added).
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se rule would tempt a public body to contract out its establishment of
religion, by encouraging the private enterprise of the religious to exhibit
what the government could not display itself."' 5
G. Religious Establishment is Largely a Local, Rather than a National
Concern
The final element of the new integrationist church/state paradigm
is the devolution of church/state disputes to the states. Evidence of this
theme has already cropped up in disparate decisions by the present Court,
including one recent decision that represents a rare separationist victory
in a government financing case. 106 The basic position of the church/state
integrationists is that the federal government has no business stepping in
to limit close associations between local governments and powerful local
religious majorities. In the explicit articulation of these principles, Justice
Thomas has argued that under a properly construed Establishment
Clause, "[s]tates may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters
so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any individual
religious liberty interest."'1 7 Justice Thomas reaches this conclusion
based on his view that the Establishment Clause should never have been
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.
In his view, the real purpose of the Establishment Clause was to protect
state establishments of religion, not prevent them.1
0 8
Other integrationist members of the Court have been more
circumspect than Justice Thomas in expressing their desire to subject
religious minorities to the whims of locally powerful religious
communities, but they all seem at least to share the general sentiment.
The federalism approach to Establishment Clause issues has been just
below the surface of many recent church/state decisions, especially in the
area of government financing of religious activity. For example, in
105. Id. at 792 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
106. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding Washington state
statute denying state scholarship money to students seeking degrees in devotional
theology).
107. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
108. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50-51 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,109 a five-member majority upheld a
Cleveland program providing millions of dollars of public funds to
private religious schools. The Court imposed only a weak formal
neutrality requirement on localities that chose to finance private
education, and specifically refused to take into account the local religious
demographics of the private educational system. The fact that religious
schools dominate the private educational systems in some states must not
enter into the constitutional calculation, the Court's integrationist
majority held, because if such a calculation were made, "an identical
private choice program might be constitutional in some States, such as
Maine or Utah, where less than 45% of private schools are religious
schools, but not in other States, such as Nebraska or Kansas, where over
90% of private schools are religious schools." 110 But contrary to the
Zelman majority's implication, evidence of religious domination does
not undercut the separationist view of the Establishment Clause; rather, it
illustrates the very point of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment
Clause is designed to take into account the fact that in many areas
powerful religious majorities will have the capacity to use the political
system to funnel tax money to finance their sectarian goals. The larger
the religious majority, the less likely that religious diversity can serve as
an adequate political check on sectarian self-dealing; a judicially
enforced Establishment Clause exists to prevent powerful religious
majorities from using the political system to consolidate their dominance.
To an integrationist Court, however, the fig leaf of formal neutrality is all
that is required to satisfy the local government's constitutional
obligations. The fact that (as in Cleveland) 96% of the students
receiving government educational funds spend those funds in a religious
institution is quite literally irrelevant.'
A few years after it upheld the Cleveland program that funneled
substantial funds to finance religious education, the Court used the same
local-control approach to uphold a separationist scholarship program
operated by the state of Washington.' 2 Washington, which has a very
109. 536 U.S. at 643.
110. Id. at 657-58.
111. Id. at 658 (quoting ninety-six percent figure and asserting that "we have
recently found it irrelevant even to the constitutionality of a direct aid program that a
vast majority of program benefits went to religious schools").
112. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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strict separation principle in its state constitution, 1 3 designed its
scholarship program to ensure that no state funds would be used to
finance religious education. In Locke v. Davey, the Court noted the
strong anti-establishment sentiment in some states' 4 and held that the
enforcement of this sentiment in state law did not violate the federal
Constitution. The Court noted that there was "play in the joints"
between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,' 15 and that this
"play" permits a state to be far more rigorous than the federal
Constitution in prohibiting all forms of direct and indirect aid to
religion. I" 6 The Court's recognition that "we can think of few areas in
which a State's antiestablishment interests come more into play'" 17 is
certain to please separationists, but the separationist victory in this
particular local battle is likely to be Pyrrhic if it entails surrendering the
national war over a uniform meaning of the federal Establishment
Clause. If one places Locke and Zelman side-by-side, the result is a
constitutional regime in which the Supreme Court steps aside and lets the
religious contestants decide most (or all) of these matters on a local level.
In some states the separationists will win the political battle; in other
states the religious groups will prevail. Either way, the Constitution is
satisfied.
I will leave until the final section a full discussion of what this
localization of church/state disputes portends for religious dissenters in a
country in which significant religious homogeneity is the rule in
approximately one-third of the states.18 For the moment, however, it is
worth noting that there is a single theme running through all of the
components of the integrationist paradigm discussed in this section,
which culminates with the proposition that the resolution of disputes over
religion should be shifted from the national to the local level of
government. The theme unifying the various aspects of the integrationist
paradigm is that the law of church and state should no longer be
113. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11, which states in part that "[n]o public
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment."
114. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 (noting the many state constitutions that
included anti-establishment provisions at the time of the founding).
115. Id. at 718-19 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
116. Id. at 722.
117. Id.
118. See infra Section IV.
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primarily a constitutional matter, but rather should be considered largely
political in nature. Church/state integrationists believe that the rules
governing the relationship between church and state, if they exist at all,
should be fought out in the political process just like the rules regarding
every other type of public policy. This will be a comforting prospect
only to those who read the history of political disputes over religion as
largely peaceful, rational, tolerant, and calm affairs. Anyone who sees a
darker tone to the history of religious political discord has cause to
worry. Maybe sixty years of separationist jurisprudence has instilled in
this society a degree of religious tolerance sufficient to prevent the worst
excesses that usually attend political battles over religion elsewhere.
Then again, considering the vitriol that has been directed at the very
notion of church/state separation over the last few years, maybe not.
III. THE NEW COURT'S REVAMPED ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
The one thing that almost everyone is likely to concede about the
shift in power to the Court's newly dominant church/state integrationists
is that the new majority is likely to clean up the doctrinal thicket that has
grown around the Establishment Clause over the last several decades. At
present, there are ten different doctrinal standards for applying the
Establishment Clause that have been embraced by one or more Justices
currently on the Court. These include:
(1) The notorious Lemon test, which requires that "[f]irst, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ....
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion." 119
(2) An endorsement analysis, which modifies the first two
prongs of the Lemon test to inquire "whether government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion . . . . [and] whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in
fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval."
12 0
119. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted)
(alteration added).
120. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(alteration added).
[Vol. 5
2006] VESTIGES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE 37
(3) The broad coercion analysis used by Justice Kennedy in Lee
v. Weisman,121 which takes into account government facilitation of
private social and peer group pressure on religious dissenters.
(4) Justice Scalia's narrow coercion analysis, which prohibits
only "coercion of religious orthodoxy and. . . financial support by force
of law and threat ofpenalty."
122
(5) A formal neutrality standard, which is used in cases
involving government financial aid to religious institutions, and holds
that
where a government aid program is neutral with
respect to religion, and provides assistance directly
to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a
result of their own genuine and independent private
choice, the program is not readily subject to
123challenge under the Establishment Clause.
(6) A substantive neutrality standard, which asks whether
government aid to a religious organization actually advances the• . 124
sectarian goals of the organization.
(7) Justice Thomas's disincorporation theory, which states that
the Establishment Clause should not have been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore imposes no limits whatsoever on
state and local governments. 1
2 5
(8) The nonpreferential establishment standard, which would
permit any religious activity by the government so long as the
government does not prefer one specific religious sect over another.
121. 505 U.S. 577 (1992); see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
124. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837-40 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the plurality's limited focus on formal
neutrality and suggesting that a more rigorous analysis of government aid is
necessary). Justice O'Connor never provided a clear description of the precise
parameters of this substantive neutrality, beyond noting that it was constitutionally
impermissible for a religious organization receiving government funds to divert
those funds to sectarian activities. Although Justice O'Connor has now left the
Court, Justice Breyer joined her Mitchell opinion, and presumably will continue to
be concerned about the issues she raised.
125. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50-51 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist popularized this analysis in an opinion'26 that
current Chief Justice Roberts seems to have endorsed while working for
the Reagan Administration. 
127
(9) The divisiveness standard, which would judge the
constitutionality of a government action endorsing religion based on
whether the action caused substantial religious strife.
12 8
(10) An ad hoc analysis, which gives up the effort to define a
constitutional standard for applying the Establishment Clause on the
ground that "[w]hile the Court's prior tests provide useful guideposts...
no exact formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases."
129
It is relatively simple to identify the standards listed above that
will not long survive the Court's turn toward the integration of church
and state. The Lemon test, in particular, has long been the bete noir of
the integrationist wing of the Court.13  Justice Scalia's criticism of what
he calls "the brain-spun 'Lemon test"'" 31 has been particularly scathing.
He once likened Lemon to "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried.' ' 132 This time Lemon may be interred permanently.
The Court is also likely to abandon the endorsement test, which builds on
Lemon, and has been criticized from an integrationist perspective
126. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. See supra note 4.
128. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2871 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (voting to permit a Ten Commandments monument on
the grounds of the Texas state legislature based on the observation that "as a
practical matter of degree [the Texas] display is unlikely to prove divisive"
(alteration added)); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 725 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In a society as
religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that we must rely on the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to protect against religious strife,
particularly when what is at issue is an area as central to religious belief as the
shaping, through primary education, of the next generation's minds and spirits.").
129. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(alteration added).
130. For examples of criticism of Lemon, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
644-45 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2751 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
132. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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because the .effort to assess the religious meaning of a government action
is "fraught with futility.' ' 133 From the perspective of the integrationists,
the endorsement test "either gives insufficient weight to the views of
nonadherents and adherents alike, or it provides no principled way to
choose between those views."' 34 Particular criticisms aside, the real
reason the integrationists detest both Lemon and the endorsement variant
of Lemon is that both tests are deeply tied to the notion that religion
should not infiltrate the government, either overtly, through statutes that
have religious effects, or surreptitiously, through the passage of facially
secular legislation for religious reasons.
For similar reasons, religious divisiveness does not seem to
concern the integrationists. Justice Scalia even mocks the separationist
concern with the possibility that a religious group's "actions may prove(shuder!) ... ,135
(shudder!) divisive. The substantive neutrality analysis is also
unlikely to find favor in the new Court, since it was raised in response to
the heavily integrationist overtones of Justice Thomas's plurality opinion
in Mitchell v. Helms.136 Finally, an ad hoc analysis will be unnecessary
for an integrationist Court once it provides a definitive standard for
compliance with the Establishment Clause that has no real substance.
Which leaves the five remaining standards, all of which can
easily be combined into an essentially toothless mechanism for granting
the government virtually unfettered authority to endorse religion and
finance the activities of religious organizations. The model for this
approach has already been provided by the existing integrationist
members of the Court. In the government financing cases, for example,
the integrationists have articulated the standard clearly in Zelman and
Mitchell. In Zelman they have said that aid to religious organizations
will be judged by a formal neutrality standard, such that the mere
pretense that all religious and secular organizations can apply for a
government aid program will render that program constitutional-even if
the reality is that virtually 100% of the funds under the program go to
133. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 126 (2001) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
136. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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religious organizations, and even if the sums in question run into the
millions of dollars. 1
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Mitchell fine-tunes this analysis by making it clear that so long
as a program satisfies the formal neutrality requirement, the Constitution
is not violated if the religious organization receiving the government
funds converts those funds to specifically religious purposes:
So long as the governmental aid is not itself
"unsuitable for use in the public schools because of
religious content," and eligibility for aid is
determined in a constitutionally permissible
manner [i.e., through a formally neutral
framework], any use of that aid to indoctrinate
cannot be attributed to the government and is thus
not of constitutional concern.138
In other words, the government cannot give a religious school Bibles, but
it may give the religious school money that the school can use to buy
Bibles. Welcome to the brave new world of an eviscerated
Establishment Clause.
In the area of religious endorsements by the government, a
similarly weak standard will apply. In the symbolic endorsement context
the integrationists are likely to apply something akin to Justice Scalia's
narrow coercion standard, on the ground that any restriction on religion
more rigorous than this would "signify the callous indifference toward• ,,139
religious faith that our cases and traditions do not require. There
might be some slight willingness to go beyond a standard requiring proof
of outright legal coercion; Justice Kennedy acknowledges, for example,
that the Establishment Clause "forbids a city to permit the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall,"' 140 although his
phrasing of this point leaves in question the constitutional status of a
temporary cross on the roof of city hall.
Two of the remaining standards may be easily incorporated into
this mix. The nonpreferential establishment analysis is inherent in the
137. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
138. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (alteration
added).
139. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 661.
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formal neutrality standard, since under a formal neutrality standard the
government would be permitted to fund many different churches, which
conforms to the gist of the nonpreferential notion that the government
may establish religion in general so long as it does not favor a particular
sect. Likewise, with regard to the disincorporation standard, it would be
simple for the Court to conclude, based on a revised historical analysis,
that the Establishment Clause was mistakenly incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment; after all, Justice Thomas has already written that
opinion. On the other hand, given the fact that very little will violate the
Establishment Clause in the new era, anyway, it hardly seems worth the
bother to release state and local governments from shackles that are no
longer locked.
All of which leaves the religion-in-school cases as the only area
in which (because of Justice Kennedy's reluctance to follow in the
school cases the instincts he exhibits in other areas of church/state
disputes) the Establishment Clause will retain some vitality-at least
unless and until a sixth church/state integrationist joins the others on the
Court.
This description of the doctrinal fallout from the adoption of a
church/state integrationist perspective on the Establishment Clause paints
a bleak picture of the future of religious liberty in the United States.
Indeed, it is difficult to see what will remain of the Establishment Clause
in an integrationist regime. To address that issue, it is necessary to
broaden the focus of analysis once again, and revisit the basic question of
what the integration of church and state is really intended to achieve.
IV. WHAT'S LEFT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?: THE MEANING OF
THE INTEGRATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Proponents of abandoning Jefferson's and Madison's notion of
church/state separation usually cast their arguments in the negative; they
are very clear about what they are against. Opponents of church/state
separation are much less clear, however, about what they are for. As a
starting point, it should be clear that there are only two models of
church/state relations. If we abandon the model defined by the
separation of church and state, the only other option is to adopt a model
defined by the integration of church and state. But beyond the doctrinal
details discussed in the previous section, what does- the integration of
church and state really mean? What kind of society is the integration
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paradigm supposed to serve? More precisely, can the integrationist
paradigm logically impose any real limits on the religious activities of
the government beyond what is already available under the Free Exercise
and Free Speech Clauses of the same Amendment? Does the
integrationist paradigm effectively write the Establishment Clause out of
the Constitution?
A few points seem beyond serious debate. At a bare minimum, a
constitutional structure defined by the integration of church and state
would permit the government to become infused with sectarian
influences and would also permit the state to advance sectarian interests
through the use of government symbols, financing, and moral and
spiritual suasion. As the discussion in Section II of the first component
of the integrationist paradigm makes clear, this conclusion is at the heart
of the paradigm shift away from separationism. The erection of crosses
on public property, government financing of religious schools and social
service programs, and officially sanctioned prayer are all consistent with
the integrationist notion that this is a religious country, which needs a
steady infusion of religion into its political institutions to maintain the
culture's social bearings. Any attempt to deny the government the ability
to engage religion in this way would require the courts to fall back into
the separationist mindset that a majority of the Court actively opposes.
But a constitutional theory that permits the government to use
religion extensively and overtly in this fashion would seem to leave little
for the Establishment Clause to do. In particular, there seems to be no
logical constitutional restriction on government favoritism of the
religious sects that dominate among members of the political majority.
The integrationist response to this fear is to fall back on the claim that the
integration of church and state will be marked by a benignly ecumenical
inclusiveness, which will be policed by an Establishment Clause that is
interpreted in light of the country's history of respecting religious
diversity, the population's general inclination toward religious
forbearance and moderation, and the broad unity of purpose among the
various different faiths that comprise the American religious
landscape. 14  Unfortunately, all of these claims regarding the inherent
141. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-64 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The two opinions of Justice Scalia that have been referred to repeatedly
in this Article-his dissent in Lee and his dissent in McCreary County-emphasize
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inclusiveness of a system that integrates church and state are probably
wrong.
With regard to the country's history of respecting religious
diversity, the sad fact is that the history of relations between dominant
and minority religious groups in this country is not a terribly happy one.
In pre-revolutionary times, religious groups who came to American
seeking religious freedom for themselves quickly fell into the habit of
oppressing members of other faiths when they became the dominant
religious group in their new home. The history of the American colonies
is riddled with examples of religious oppression. When John Jay, the
first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was governor of New York, he
proposed to ban Catholics from that state. 142 Similarly, Massachusetts
proposed to banish Anabaptists and to execute Catholic priests who
strayed back into Massachusetts after having been excluded from that
state.143 Religious oppression did not end with the revolution. In the
young republic religious oppression took various forms, from the refusal
each of these themes, but these themes are repeated at various times by many
different members of the Court. Even some who do not agree with the general
agenda of integrating church and state nevertheless are sympathetic to these
arguments. In her concurring opinion in the Pledge of Allegiance case, for example,
Justice O'Connor provided her version of how references to God were inherently
inclusive and unifying:
I believe that although these references [to God] speak
in the language of religious belief, they are more
properly understood as employing the idiom for
essentially secular purposes. One such purpose is to
commemorate the role of religion in our history. In my
view, some references to religion in public life and
government are the inevitable consequence of our
Nation's origins.... [The Court] should not deny that
our history has left its mark on our national traditions. It
is unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious
refugees and dedicated to religious freedom should find
references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and
oaths.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35-36 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (alterations added).
142. See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 162 (1986).
143. See ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 42-43 & nn. 26-27
(J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Fontana Press 1994) (1848).
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to grant full rights to Catholics in five states, 44 to the more mundane
Protestant establishments in states like. Massachusetts,145  and
requirements in states like Virginia that non-Anglican clergy be specially
licensed to perform marriage rites.
4 6
Modem proponents of church/state integration have tin ears for
the implications of the history they cite to support their plan to permit the
government to engage in religious activity. The centerpiece of Justice
Thomas's arguments against separationist Establishment Clause theory
in the financing context, for example, is the history of anti-Catholic
sentiment during the nineteenth century. 147  But one of the primary
manifestations of anti-Catholic animus during the nineteenth century was
the use of public schools to proselytize Catholic children on behalf of
dominant Protestant sects. 14 8 Trading a coercive use of the government
by Protestant sects for a system in which Catholics may join Protestants
in a more expansive version of religious coercion seems to miss the point
of the history that Justice Thomas so heatedly recounts.
The fact is that the proponents of the integration of church and
state can only rest their proposed revamping of the Establishment Clause
on the country's history as a religious nation if they first rewrite the
nature of that history. Douglas Laycock once nicely summarized the
country's religious context at the time of the framing:
The nation was overwhelmingly Protestant and
hostile to other faiths. Bare tolerance of other
144. See 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
402 (North Carolina); id. at 406 (New York); id. at 430 (New Hampshire); id. at 435
(New Jersey); id. at 441 (Vermont).
145. See, e.g., III FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, ED., THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 1890
(Government Printing Office 1909) (discussing the Declaration of Rights in the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution, which required towns in the state "to make suitable
provision, at their own expense, for the institutions of the public worship of God,
and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion
and morality").
146. See SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 494 (1902).
147. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (in which Justice Thomas refers
to anti-Catholic sentiment during the nineteenth century, and concludes that
"hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do
not hesitate to disavow").
148. See STOKES, supra note 144, at 830-35.
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faiths was a major accomplishment, not yet safe
from reaction; accepting other faiths as equals was
far in the future . . . Non-Protestants could
practice their religion, but they often could not
vote, hold public office, or publicly criticize
Protestantism. Non-Protestants certainly could not
expect the government to refrain from preaching
Protestantism. These conditions would not change
easily. Half a century later, mob violence, church
burnings, and deaths would result when Catholics
objected to studying the "Protestant Bible" in
public schools. The anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant
Know Nothing Party would sweep elections in
eight states.
In 1791, almost no one thought that
government support of Protestantism was
inconsistent with religious liberty, because almost
no one could imagine a more broadly pluralist
state. Protestantism ran so deep among such
overwhelming numbers of people that almost no
one could see that his principles on church taxes
might have implications for other kinds of
government support for religion. The exclusion of
non-Protestants from pronouncements of religious
liberty was not nearly so thorough or so cruel as the
exclusion of slaves from pronouncements that all
men were created equal, but both blind spots were
species of the same genus.149
At the end of the day, the argument that the United States is
historically a religious nation simply proves too much, because an honest
appraisal of the nation's early religious tendencies would produce
something like the nineteenth century Supreme Court's assertion that the
United States is a "Christian nation,"15 or in the blunter words of a South
Dakota Supreme Court Justice in the early 1920s, the claim that
149. Laycock, supra note 50, at 918-19.
150. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
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"Christianity is our national religion."151 Under whatever formulation,
the exclusionary ramifications are obvious, and despite their repressive
overtones, these ramifications have been explicitly embraced by notable
figures earlier in the nation's history. "The real object of the [First]
amendment," Justice Story wrote in his Commentaries on the
Constitution, "was not to countenance much less advance
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but
to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects . ,,2 As a historical
matter, therefore, Justice Scalia is flatly inaccurate in asserting that the
proper historical approach to defining the nature of a religious state in
this country would be monotheistic rather than Christian.153 In light of
this background, the comforting overtures toward ecumenical inclusion
by the advocates of the newly religious state can be seen as little more
than ahistorical political gestures intended to mollify members of non-
Christian faiths to the point that they concede hard-won constitutional
protections against expressions of dominance by the country's religious
majority.
The second variation on the theme that ecumenical inclusion will
characterize the new regime of church/state integration is that the country
is naturally inclined toward a broad deference to and respect for the
many different faiths that are now part of the American religious
landscape. Once again, Justice Scalia has articulated this argument most
forcefully, in various different contexts.1 54 If almost all of us agree that
151. State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 226 N.W. 348, 355 (S.D. 1929)
(Sherwood, P.J., dissenting).
152. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 728 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
153. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See id. ("Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is thus
indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned,
from publicly honoring God. Both practices are recognized across such a broad
and diverse range of the population-from Christians to Muslims-that they
cannot be reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a particular
religious viewpoint."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of
sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife. And they
also knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among
religious believers of various faiths a toleration-no, an affection-for one
another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all
worship and seek.").
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God is a good thing, Scalia repeatedly argues, then what is the problem
with "our" government recognizing that fact officially?
The problem with this argument is that it does not accurately
reflect the motivation or the effect of the religious exercises at issue
when the government endorses religion. No matter how subtly it is
accomplished, the incorporation into official government functions of
even the most benign religious symbols and exercises is an assertion of
dominance by the religious majority. In a school prayer case decided
soon after Lee v. Weisman, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described
the gist of the religious majority's perspective:
This case requires us to consider why so many
people attach importance to graduation ceremonies.
If they only seek government's recognition of
student achievement, diplomas suffice. If they
only seek God's recognition, a privately-sponsored
baccalaureate will do. But to experience the
community's recognition of student achievement,
they must attend the public ceremony that other
interested community members also hold so dear.
By attending graduation to experience and
participate in the community's display of support
for the graduates, people should not be surprised to
find the event affected by community standards.
The Constitution requires nothing different.'
55
To rephrase the Fifth Circuit's conclusion slightly: If the public
were merely interested in the secular task of education, a graduation
ceremony would suffice; if the public were merely interested in
practicing its religion, then a private religious ceremony would be
sufficient; but what the public (by which the court means "the dominant
faction of the public") really wants is to assert control over the
government ceremony by infusing the ceremony with the dominant
faction's religious standards. As the court forthrightly admits, religious
dissenters are thereby gently reminded of their outsider status. To the
extent that religious dissenters may have the bad fortune to end up in a
community that does not include many of their number, the court dryly
notes, they have no cause to complain. According to the court, members
155. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
of religious minorities who attend "the community's" ceremony "should
not be surprised to find the event affected by community standards."'
' 56
Thus, the inclusion of religion in the ceremony is specifically intended to
mark the religious majority's territory; it's our community, the majority
says to dissenters, so get used to it. So much for the claim of ecumenical
inclusion.
It is difficult to take seriously the overtures to inclusion
frequently espoused by proponents of the integration of church and state.
Integrating religion into government affairs is about power, control, and
the communication of domination. It would be illogical for any religious
group to argue against the separation of church and state in the hope that
some other religious group would infuse public affairs (including the
system of public education) with the other group's contrary (or even
sinful) religious views. Religious groups who seek to incorporate
religious views into government logically only seek to advance their own
religious views through government. The use of government to inculcate
society with the dominant group's religious faith is the entire object of
the exercise.
One of the most common objections to the separationist
Establishment Clause model asserts that separationism improperly denies
to members of the religious majority the right to exercise the common
prerogative of those who are victorious in the political process, which is
to incorporate the victor's views into law.157 This is also the primary
objection to the secular purpose requirement of the three-part Lemon
standard. 158 The underlying theme of these arguments is that religiously-
based political activity should be treated in the same manner as secular
political activity. But proponents of the integration of church and state
cannot have it both ways. They cannot argue, on the one hand, that the
separationist Establishment Clause model unfairly disenfranchises
religious political activists, and then on the other hand deny that
powerful religious factions want the ability to enact into law policies that
156. Id. at 972.
157. Michael Perry has recently argued, for example, that to prohibit
legislators from writing religiously based moral proscriptions into law would
"unfairly deprivilege religious faith, relative to secular belief, as a ground of moral
judgment-and unfairly deprivilege too, therefore, those moral judgments that, in
their view, cannot stand independent of religious faith." PERRY, supra note 61, at
30.
158. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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are specifically religious in nature and flatly inconsistent with the
religious views of their religious adversaries. Religion is either a
contentiously political phenomenon or it is not. Religious activists
cannot demand to be treated the same as every other scrappy political
group when opposing constitutional limits on government political
activity, then immediately clamber onto the high ground and deny that
they will use their new political authority to impose their views on
members of other religious groups. Politics is about victors exercising
power over losers. An unavoidable consequence of the integration of
church and state, therefore, is that religion will become like every other
political matterand political battles will therefore be fought along
religious lines. History abundantly demonstrates the fratricidal dangers
of going down this path, and this reality cannot be avoided by illogically
claiming that a religious politics will be less fractious than political
disputes over other matters.
The third defense of the claim that integrating church and state
will be defined by ecumenical inclusion is the notion that the form of
religion adopted by the new sectarian government will incorporate the
views of virtually everyone in society and therefore will not lead to
cultural and political divisions along religious lines. This notion is
inherent in Justice Scalia's references to the bonding effect of members
of the community "voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God
whom they all worship and seek."' 59 Of course, the assertion that any
concept of God could encompass all faiths should be viewed as a mere
rhetorical flourish, not a statement of literal fact. In any community
large enough to be worth discussing, members of that community will
not "all worship and seek" the same God. In any but the most intimate
gatherings some -people will not want to pray with members of other
faiths, some will not want to pray in public, others will not want to pray
in response to social pressure, and still others will not want to pray at all.
Indeed, even Justice Scalia has implicitly acknowledged that an all-
embracing God does not exist; this explains his subsequent effort to
collect under one tent the major monotheistic faiths as favored religions,
while diminishing the importance (and the numbers) of those left outside
the tent. 60 But even this effort is intellectually dishonest to the extent
that it relies upon the pretense that only a small number of unimportant
159. Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. See supra note 74-76 and accompanying text.
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religious eccentrics will object to the sectarian principles adopted by the
newly religious government.
The most forthright rendition of this pretense is in Justice. . 161
Scalia's opinion in one of the recent Ten Commandments decisions.
In that opinion Justice Scalia argued that the government should be
allowed to endorse the existence of God and the overtly religious axioms
embodied in the Ten Commandments because the Commandments are
embraced by the "97.7% of all believers [who are] monotheistic.' ' 162 The
recognition of God and the official endorsement of biblically derived
precepts such as the Ten Commandments should be constitutionally
permissible, Scalia argued, because such practices "are recognized across
such a broad and diverse range of the population-from Christians to
Muslims-that they cannot be reasonably understood as a government
endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint." 163  Thus, as he
concluded elsewhere in the same opinion, the overwhelming numbers of
citizens who agree with these religious propositions justify permitting the
government to "disregard" the miniscule and therefore constitutionally
insignificant numbers of those who do not. "With respect to public
acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation's
historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard
of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the
disregard of devout atheists."'164
The only problem with these statements is that their central
premise-that all but one or two percent of the nation's citizens embrace
the government's authority to engage in these specific religious
exercises-is demonstrably inaccurate. The fact that, as Scalia points
out, 97.7% of the population is monotheistic does not in any fashion
suggest that 97.7% of the population agrees with the proposition that the
government should be used to advance the cause of a particular religion
or religion in general. First of all, there is serious disagreement among
the various faiths (even among the Christian sects) about what mandates
are in the Commandments.65 Even if the various monotheistic faiths
161. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2753(Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
163. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and
Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1477 (2005) (describing the different views of
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agreed on the content of the Ten Commandments, there are serious
disagreements among the various faiths as to how those Commandments
(and the other precepts of their faiths) should be presented to the world.
For example, Justice Scalia's 97.7% figure includes both
members of both the Jewish and Christian faith. As Scalia notes, both of
these religions are monotheistic, but they take a very different approach
to the issue of proselytizing members of other faiths. Judaism does not
embrace proselytizing, in part because Jewish theology does not declare
that only Jews can have a valid relationship with God.166 Christians, on
the other hand, are specifically directed in the New Testament to: "Go ye
therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father,
and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.' ' 167  From the Christian
perspective, proselytizing does nothing to infringe upon the beliefs of
members of other faiths. With respect to Jews, for example, "a Jew who
becomes a Christian does not lose anything Jewish but completes his or
her identity." '  This attitude creates a certain inevitable friction between
the sects. "Christians are often asked by Jews to agree not to
'proselytize.' They cannot comply, of course, since their Lord has
commanded them otherwise."'' 69 Allowing the government to embrace
specifically religious commands such as those in the Decalogue will
always be perceived against the background of conflicts over some
faiths' desire to convert those who belong to other faiths. Perhaps
church/state integration can be accomplished without having the
government's religious activities lapse into proselytizing, although that is
what the Ten Commandments contain among Jewish, Roman Catholic, and different
Protestant sects). For an extended discussion of the complications that arise
whenever religious objects (including Ten Commandments displays) are considered
in a legal context, see Frank S. Ravitch, Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1011 (2005).
166. See GEORGE ROBINSON, ESSENTIAL JUDAISM: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
BELIEFS, CUSTOMS, AND RITUALS 175 (2001) ("It is said in Jewish lore that there will
be a reward in the World to Come for the righteous of all nations, and those who
follow the Noahide laws [the essential religious duties of humanity as prescribed in
Torah]... are considered to be among them. Indeed, for that reason, Jews have felt
less of a pressing need to seek converts; we don't believe that only 'believers can be
saved."').
167. Matthew 28:19.
168. Peter Kreeft, Comparing Christianity and Judaism, NAT'L CATH.
REGISTER, May, 1987.
169. Id.
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highly doubtful. In any event, it should be clear that members of a faith
that does not seek converts will have a different perspective on state-
supported religious activity than members of a faith who are instructed
by their God to convert the world.
Jews are not the only religious group improperly lumped
together by Justice Scalia in his integrationist phalanx. There are also
substantial numbers of Christians who adopt a position that is
diametrically opposed to the vision of church/state integration sketched
by Scalia. This should not be news to anyone; opposition to church/state
integration from Christian sects has long been a feature of the American
religious scene. Traditional Baptists were, of course, some of the most
vociferous opponents of religious establishments in the colonies and
early Republic, as were Quakers. 70  They were joined in states like
Virginia-where some of the most important battles over establishment
occurred-by Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, and even some
Methodists. It is fair to say that for many of these groups the biblical
mandate to convert the world is conditioned by the injunction in the
Sermon on the Mount to be wary of praying "like the hypocrites. For
they love to pray standing in the synagogues and on the comers of the
streets, that they may be seen by men."' 72 For traditional evangelical
sects such as the Baptists, the use of government for religious purposes
soils the entire enterprise. In this view, the "wall of separation" between
church and state is necessary just as much to protect the purity of religion
as it is to protect the independence of the government-which was the
reason that Roger Williams coined the phrase "wall of separation" in the
first place. 
173
170. See LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1986) (noting common opposition of Baptists and Quakers
to religious establishments, and further noting in the rare towns where they formed a
majority they successfully opposed the payment of legally mandated religious
tithes). "Neither Baptists nor Quakers maintained a learned ministry, and both
believed that the state had no jurisdiction over religion, which should be left to [the]
voluntary support of believers." Id. (alteration added).
171. See James Madison, Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations.
Ecclesiastical Endowments; in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's Detatched Memoranda, 3
WM. & MARY Q., Third series 534, 551, 555 (1946).
172. Matthew 6:5.
173. See Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Examined and Answered (1644),
reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 313, 392 (Russel &
Russel, Inc. 1963) ("[W]hen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of
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The final problem with Justice Scalia's effort to claim near-
unanimous support for sectarian governance is his willingness to ignore
entirely the presence in American society of substantial numbers of
nonreligious or religiously indifferent individuals. This is not a minor
oversight. According to the same source of religious demographics that
provided Justice Scalia the statistic that 97.7% of all believers are
monotheists, 13.2% of the population describes itself as nonreligious,
and another 6.3% of the population refuses to respond to questions about
its religious affiliation. 174  Thus, a substantial part of the national
population is avowedly secular. On a more localized basis, the numbers
of secularists are even more pronounced. People who express no
religious faith are the largest "religious" group in four states: Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Wyoming.175 Fully 25% of the population in
Washington classifies itself as "nonreligious.' 76  The portion of the
population that identifies itself as nonreligious is equally as large in other
western states. Even in Utah, for example, the nonreligious portion of
the population is the second largest religious group-almost twenty
percent of the population.' 77 The percentages are only slightly smaller in
the northeastern states. 178  Only in the southeastern states is the
nonreligious portion of the population routinely counted in the single
digits.
179
Thus, in contrast to Justice Scalia's implication that permitting
the government to openly align itself with religion would ostracize only
Separation between the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of the world, God
hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the Candlestick, and made his Garden
a Wilderness, as at this day. And that ther[e]fore if he will ever please to restore his
Garden and Paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in peculiarly unto himself
from the world, and that all that shall be saved out of the world are to be transplanted
out of the Wilderness of [the] world, and added unto his Church or Garden.")
(alterations added).
174. U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 58 (125th ed. 2006) (Table No. 69).
175. ARIS 2001 Study, supra note 33, at 38. The ARIS study is one of the
most comprehensive recent state-by-state surveys of this country's religious
demographics, and is the source of the information in the table in the United States
Statistical Abstract that is cited in Justice Scalia's McCreary dissent and in supra
note 174 of this Article.
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an infinitesimal and therefore constitutionally insignificant portion of the
population, the reality is that his proposal would permit the government
to engage in activity that would directly contradict the religious views of
well over 10% and probably closer to 20% of the population. There is no
benign explanation for the refusal to take into account the views of the
nonreligious in assessing the implications of a sectarian government.
The explicit message of an approach such as Justice Scalia's is that
secularists, like their fellow outsiders the polytheists, are not full-fledged
members of the relevant polity. At least subliminally, many citizens
already seem to assume that patriotism and religious faith are
inseparable. Justice Scalia and the others in the Court's new majority
propose to erect a constitutional regime that would make this strain of
religious bigotry explicit.
At the end of the day, the main point is clear: If one adds the 10-
20% of the population that is nonreligious to the 2 or 3% of the
population who embrace nontraditional (but well-known) polytheistic
faiths, and then further adds the substantial number of Jews, Muslims,
and Christians whose denominations (or personal theology) oppose the
concept of government participation in religious affairs, then the list of
religious outsiders under the new integrationist Establishment Clause
regime becomes quite large. This reality poses problems for Justice
Scalia and the other new integrationists, on both theoretical and practical
levels. The theoretical problem it poses is that the official ostracism of
20-30% of the population undercuts the theme (frequently sounded by
Justice Scalia) that pretty much everyone in society wants the
government to become more religious, except a tiny handful of pesky
malcontents. The integrationist position becomes far less compelling if it
allows the government to engage in activity with which fully a quarter to
a third of society profoundly disagrees., The practical problem is that it is
unreasonable to expect that a quarter to a third of society will passively
subject themselves (and, in the school context, their children) to
government insinuations that their personal beliefs on matters of faith
place them outside the mainstream of American society. The more
reasonable expectation is that once the government begins to use its new
religious authority with gusto, political opposition to those religious
activities will ensue. And we will then be in precisely the position that
Madison feared: a political culture in which religion becomes the subject
of acrimonious political battles.
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Although many opponents of the separationist approach to the
Establishment Clause would undoubtedly disagree on the details of
Justice Scalia's particular rendition of the integrationist position, some
version of his argument lies just below the surface of all variations on the
integrationist theme. The basic integrationist claim is that the integration
of church and state is the best interpretation of the Establishment Clause
because the United States is historically and demographically a religious
country, and "religious" in this context refers to the form of religion that
has traditionally dominated the culture, which is Protestant Christianity.
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the imposition of overtly theocratic
mandates such as those that exist in states such as Iran. Even in its
denuded post-Smith form,'8 0 the free exercise protection would at least
prevent the government from pursuing its sectarian agenda in a manner
that aggressively intrudes into the expressly religious activities of
members of officially disfavored faiths. Free exercise protections would
not, however, prevent the government from imposing religiously-based
moral mandates on everyone in society, nor would it prevent the
government from employing symbolic and verbal cues to urge everyone
in society to adopt the religious perspective of the political faction that
controls the government.. In short, under a regime governed by the
integration of church and state, all government religious activity that falls
short of legalized coercion of religious practice would be viewed as
simply a recognition of the reality that this is, as the Court noted early in
its history, a Christian nation.1
81
All of this foreshadows a state of affairs that this country has not
faced in many decades. As the new Court consolidates its recent move
away from a separationist Establishment Clause model, religion will, at
least conceptually, become just as much a matter for political debate as
education policy, trade policy, or the efficacy of the flat tax. The
political reality in many parts of the country is that the details of the
proper form of religion to be incorporated into the public sphere will not
be debated at all, but will rather be treated as a universally accepted
180. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (holding that laws targeting specific religious groups or practices are not laws
of general applicability, and requiring such laws to meet a compelling interest test);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (permitting the government to
apply all laws of general applicability to religious practitioners without establishing
a compelling interest).
181. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
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expression of social values that effectively become synonymous with
patriotism itself. Religious practitioners will be granted the ability to ply
their wares politically, but it will be largely a Soviet-style political
exercise, in which dissent is assumed not to exist because the expression
of dissent will subject the dissenter to the kind of social reprobation that
forecloses serious participation in the political culture. In the land of the
blind, the one-eyed man is a dangerous oddball.
It is likely that proponents of the new integrationist
Establishment Clause model will reject virtually all of these derogatory
descriptions and dire predictions about the consequences that attend the
constitutional recognition of a sectarian political culture. But if the new
integrationists seek to allay the fears of the dwindling numbers of
separationists, then they need to answer a few questions about their new
constitutional paradigm. For example: What, in the view of the
integrationists, is left of the Establishment Clause in the new
constitutional regime? Under the lenient integrationist view of the
government religious activity, what actions of the government will
violate the Establishment Clause that do not already violate the Free
Exercise or Free Speech Clauses? If the answer to the previous question
is "none," then what does this say about the integrationist approach as a
matter of constitutional interpretation? Is it a legitimate constitutional
interpretation to consider the Establishment Clause a mere appendage to
the Bill of Rights, with no effective meaning? Even though they do not
say so explicitly, have the integrationists essentially adopted the view of
the Establishment Clause long advanced by Justice Thomas, which is
that the Establishment Clause should not be interpreted to limit religious
establishments by state and local governments, but rather should be
interpreted to protect sectarian actions by the very governments that most
directly affect citizens' daily lives? And finally, how does the
integrationist approach jibe with any current concept of religious liberty?
What is the meaning of religious liberty in a system in which the
government can explicitly endorse some religious views over others,
explicitly link approved religious views with patriotism ("one nation
under God"), and "disregard" those who do not conform to the
government's approved brand of religious faith? In short, what kind of a
country do the religious integrationists really intend to create?
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CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, religious groups who seek to use the
government to advance their cause will rue the day that they captured
control of the Supreme Court. The integration of church and state is
most likely to lead to one of two consequences, neither of which should
give comfort to even the most powerful and well-entrenched religious
group.
One possible consequence can be called the European option.
Throughout most of its modem history, Europe has been defined by
various degrees of religious establishment, and the net result has been
that religion has for all practical purposes become a meaningless
afterthought for most Europeans. Demographic surveys of Europeans
attest to the gradual fading away of religious sentiment among every
sector of the population in every European country. 182 If this is indeed
the consequence that follows in the United States from the
implementation of the new integrationist model of the Establishment
Clause, no one should be surprised; after all, Madison himself described
the phenomenon in the Memorial and Remonstrance over two hundred
183years ago.
The other possible consequence of adopting the integrationist
Establishment Clause model is that religious disputes will exponentially
increase in both number and intensity as the government becomes
increasingly involved in religious affairs at a time when the culture is
182. For a compilation of demographic surveys. of religious belief in Europe
and elsewhere, see Phil Zuckerman, Atheism: Contemporary Rates and Patterns in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ATHEISM (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy)
(forthcoming 2006) (a preliminary draft of this essay can be found at
http://www.pitzer.edu/academics/faculty/zuckerman/atheism.html). For an extended
argument describing the reasons for secularization in Western Europe, see STEVE
BRUCE, GOD is DEAD: SECULARIZATION IN THE WEST (2002).
183. See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, excerpted in Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1947) ("Because experience witnesseth that
ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of
Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries, has the
legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or
less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the
laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of
Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every
sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy.").
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becoming ever more religiously diverse, and ever more intensely divided
politically and culturally. Once we abandon a separationist
Establishment Clause, religious factions will no longer be constrained by
the sense of mutually assured destruction that has always been one of the
most compelling justifications for keeping religion out of politics. In the
new America, different types of fundamentalists will fight each other,
and fundamentalists of all stripes will do battle with an equally
vociferous and growing group of Americans who are intensely averse to
social and political pressure to adopt a publicly religious stance in life.
None of this should make anyone happy, and the implications for
religious liberty are not good, but every indication is that the new Court
will be content to step aside and let us fight it out among ourselves.
